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Abstract
Community sensing, fusing information from popula-
tions of privately-held sensors, presents a great oppor-
tunity to create efficient and cost-effective sensing ap-
plications. Yet, reasonable privacy concerns often limit
the access to such data streams. How should systems
valuate and negotiate access to private information, for
example in return for monetary incentives? How should
they optimally choose the participants from a large pop-
ulation of strategic users with privacy concerns, and
compensate them for information shared?
In this paper, we address these questions and present
a novel mechanism, SEQTGREEDY, for budgeted re-
cruitment of participants in community sensing. We first
show that privacy tradeoffs in community sensing can
be cast as an adaptive submodular optimization prob-
lem. We then design a budget feasible, incentive com-
patible (truthful) mechanism for adaptive submodular
maximization, which achieves near-optimal utility for
a large class of sensing applications. This mechanism
is general, and of independent interest. We demonstrate
the effectiveness of our approach in a case study of air
quality monitoring, using data collected from the Me-
chanical Turk platform. Compared to the state of the
art, our approach achieves up to 30% reduction in cost
in order to achieve a desired level of utility.
Introduction
Community sensing is a new paradigm for creating effi-
cient and cost-effective sensing applications by harnessing
the data of large populations of sensors. For example, the
accelerometer data from smartphone users could be used
for earthquake detection and fine grained analysis of seis-
mic events. Velocity data from GPS devices (in smartphones
or automobiles) could be used to provide real-time traffic
maps or detect accidents. However, accessing this stream
of private sensor data raises reasonable concerns about pri-
vacy of the individual users. For example, mobility patterns
and the house or office locations of a user could possibly
be inferred from their GPS tracks (Krumm 2007). Beyond
concerns about sharing sensitive information, there are gen-
eral anxieties among users about sharing data from their pri-
vate devices. These concerns limit the practical applicability
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of deploying such applications. In this paper, we propose a
principled approach to negotiate access to certain private in-
formation in an incentive-compatible manner.
Applications of community sensing are numerous. Sev-
eral case studies have demonstrated the principal feasibil-
ity and usefulness of community sensing. A number of re-
search and commercial prototypes are build, often relying
on special campaigns to recruit volunteers (Zheng, Xie, and
Ma 2010) or on contracts with service providers to obtain
anonymized data (Wunnava et al. 2007). The SenseWeb sys-
tem (Kansal et al. 2007) has been developed as an infrastruc-
ture for sharing sensing data to enable various applications.
Methods have been developed to estimate traffic (Yoon,
Noble, and Liu 2007; Mobile-Millennium 2008; Krause et
al. 2008), perform forecasts about future traffic situations
(Horvitz et al. 2005) or predict a driver’s trajectory (Krumm
and Horvitz 2006). Cell tower signals obtained from the
service providers are leveraged for travel time estimation
on roadways (Wunnava et al. 2007). Additionally, captured
images and video clips from smartphones have been used
to link places with various categories (Chon et al. 2012).
Clayton et al. (2012) describes the design of a Community
Seismic Network to detect and monitor earthquakes using a
dense network of low cost sensors hosted by volunteers from
the community. Aberer et al. (2010) envisions a community
driven sensing infrastructure for monitoring air quality.
Privacy concerns in community sensing are expected
and reasonable (Lieb 2007; Wunnava et al. 2007; Olson,
Grudin, and Horvitz 2005). Irrespective of the models of pri-
vacy we consider (Sweeney 2002; Dwork 2006; Machanava-
jjhala et al. 2006), the key concern is about identifiability
as users become members of increasingly smaller groups of
people sharing the same characteristics inferred from data.
Beyond general anxieties about the sharing of location and
mobility data, studies have demonstrated that, even with sig-
nificant attempts at obfuscation, home and work locations of
drivers can be inferred from GPS tracks (Krumm 2007).
Incentives to participants for privacy tradeoff. Olson,
Grudin, and Horvitz (2005) show that people’s willingness
to share information depends greatly on the type of informa-
tion being shared, with whom the information is shared, and
how it is going to be used. They are willing to share certain
private information if compensated in terms of their utility
gain (Krause and Horvitz 2008). In this paper, we are ex-
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ploring the design of intelligent systems that empower users
to consciously share certain private information in return of,
e.g., monetary or other form of incentives. We model the
users as strategic agents who are willing to negotiate access
to certain private information, aiming to maximize the mon-
etary incentives they receive in return. Empowering users to
opt into such negotiations is the key idea that we explore in
this paper.
Overview of our approach
Our goal is to design policies for selecting (and compensat-
ing) the participants, which provide near-optimal utility for
the sensing application under strict budget constraints. As
basis for selection, the community sensing system receives
obfuscated estimates of the private attributes. For concrete-
ness, we focus on sensor location as private information, but
our approach generalizes to other attributes. The users also
declare a bid or cost as the desired monetary incentive for
participation and hence privacy tradeoff. After receiving the
bids, the mechanism sequentially selects a participant, com-
mits to make her the payment, receives the actual private in-
formation, selects the next participant and so on. At the end,
all selected participants are provided the agreed payment.
Figure 1 illustrates this protocol.
             Allocate next participant
Commits to make payment to the participant
1
Privacy pro!les and bids
Participant reveals the actual location
            Sends the sensing data
t
T (Budget is exhausted)
Figure 1: Illustration of the protocol by which the proposed
system interacts with the users.
We model the participants as strategic agents who aim to
maximize their profit, by possibly misreporting their private
costs. As a consequence, we require the mechanism to be
truthful. In order to capture a large class of sensing applica-
tions, we only require the utility function to satisfy submod-
ularity, a natural diminishing returns condition (Nemhauser,
Wolsey, and Fisher 1978; Krause and Guestrin 2007). To de-
sign our mechanism, we first reduce the sequential negotia-
tion of the privacy tradeoff to the problem of adaptive sub-
modular maximization (Asadpour, Nazerzadeh, and Saberi
2008; Golovin and Krause 2011). Then, we extend recent
results on truthful budget feasible mechanisms for submod-
ular functions (Singer 2010; Chen, Gravin, and Lu 2011;
Singer 2012) to the adaptive setting.
Our main contributions are:
• An integrated approach to community sensing by incen-
tivizing users to share certain private information.
• A novel mechanism, SEQTGREEDY, for budgeted re-
cruitment of strategic participants, which achieves near-
optimal utility for the community sensing application.
The mechanism is general and of independent interest,
suitable also for other applications, e.g., viral marketing.
• Evaluation of our approach on a realistic case study of air
quality monitoring based on data obtained through Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk 1.
Related Work
Himmel et al. (2005) propose to provide users with rewards
such as free minutes to motivate them to accept mobile ad-
vertisements. Hui et al. (2011) develop MobiAd, a system
for targeted mobile advertisements, by utilizing the rich set
of information available on the phone and suggesting the
service providers to give discounts to the users, in order
to incentivize use of the system. Liu, Krishnamachari, and
Annavaram (2008) propose a game theoretic model of pri-
vacy for social networking-based mobile applications and
presents a tit-for-tat mechanism by which users take deci-
sions about their exposed location obfuscation for increas-
ing personal or social utility. Chorppath and Alpcan (2012)
study a privacy game in mobile commerce, where users
choose the degree of granularity at which to report their lo-
cation and the service providers offer them monetary incen-
tives under budget constraints. The best users’ response and
the optimal strategy for the company are derived by analyz-
ing the Nash equilibrium of the underlying privacy game.
This is very different from our setting as we focus on algo-
rithmic aspects of the mechanism in choosing the best set of
users for participation in community sensing. Li and Faltings
(2012) and Faltings, Jurca, and Li (2012) study the problem
of incentivizing users in community sensing to report accu-
rate measurements and place sensors in the most useful loca-
tions. While developing incentive-compatible mechanisms,
they do not consider the privacy aspect. Singla and Krause
(2013b) develops online incentive-compatible and budget
feasible mechanisms for procurement. However, they con-
sider a simple modular utility function where each partici-
pant provides a unit value. This is not applicable to our com-
munity sensing setting which deals with more complex util-
ity functions. Carrascal et al. (2013) study how users value
their personally identifiable information (PII) while brows-
ing. The experiments demonstrate that users have different
valuations, depending on the type and information content
of private data. Higher valuations are chosen for offline PII,
such as age and address, compared to browsing history. This
work is complementary and supports the assertion that users
indeed associate monetary valuations to certain private data.
Problem Statement
We now formalize the problem addressed in this paper.
Sensing phenomena. We focus on community sensing
applications with the goal to monitor some spatial phe-
nomenon, such as air quality or traffic. We discretize the en-
vironment as a finite set of locations V , where each v ∈ V
could, e.g., denote a zip code or more fine grained street
addresses, depending on the application. We quantify the
utility f(A) of obtaining measurements from a set of lo-
cations A using a set function f : 2V → R. Formally, we
1https://www.mturk.com/mturk/
(a) Population of users (b) Sensing profile of users (c) Selected participants
(d) Obfuscated user locations
yw
yw
yw
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2
3
(e) Privacy profile of user w (f) Selection under uncertainty
Figure 2: The sensing region is uniformly discretized into a set of locations V indicated by the dots. (a) illustrates a population
of users, along with their sensing profiles in (b). The set of users selected by the system in absence of privacy are shown in (c).
However, to protect privacy, users only share an obfuscated location with the system in (d) and a collection of sensing profiles
({y1w, y2w and y3w} for user w) in (e). The privacy profile of user w, given by Yw, is the uniform distribution over these sensing
profiles, given by P (Yw = yiw) =
1
3 . (f) shows the selection of the participants in presence of uncertainty introduced by privacy
profiles. The actual sensing profile is only revealed to the system after a user has been selected.
only require that f is nonnegative, monotone (i.e., when-
ever A ⊆ A′ ⊆ V it holds that f(A) ≤ f(A′)) and sub-
modular. Submodularity is an intuitive notion of diminish-
ing returns, stating that, for any sets A ⊆ A′ ⊆ V , and any
fixed location a /∈ A′ it holds that f(A ∪ {a}) − f(A) ≥
f(A′∪{a})−f(A′). As a simple, concrete example, we may
derive some nonnegative value da for observing each loca-
tion a ∈ A, and may define f(A) = ∑a∈A da. More gener-
ally, sensing at location a ∈ V may actually cover a subset
Sa of nearby locations, and f(A) =
∑{dj : j ∈ ∪a∈ASa}.
These conditions are rather general, satisfied by many sens-
ing utility functions and f can capture much more com-
plex notions, such as reduction of predictive uncertainty in a
probabilistic model (Krause and Guestrin 2007).
Sensing profile of users. We consider a community W
of |W| = N users, owning some sensing device such as
a smartphone. Each user can make observations at a set of
locations depending on her geolocation or mobility as well
as the type of device used. We model this through a collec-
tion of sensing profiles O ⊆ 2V whereby we associate each
user w ∈ W with a profile yw ∈ O, specifying the set of
locations covered by her. This set yw could be a singleton
yw = {a} for some a ∈ V , modeling the location of the user
at a particular point in time, or could model an entire tra-
jectory, visiting multiple locations in V . We denote a given
set of users S ⊆ W jointly with their sensing profiles as
yS ⊆ W×O. The goal is to select set of users S (also called
participants) so as to maximize the utility of the sensing ap-
plication given by g(yS) = f(A) where A =
⋃
s∈S ys. We
assume that each user’s maximal contribution to the utility
is bounded by a constant fmax.
Privacy profile of users. In order to protect privacy,
we consider the setting where the exact sensing profiles
yw of the users (containing, e.g., tracks of locations vis-
ited) are not known to the sensing system. Instead, yw is
only shared after obfuscation with a random perturbation in-
tended to reduce the risk of identifiability (Sweeney 2002;
Dwork 2006). The system’s highly uncertain belief about
the sensing profile of user w can therefore be represented as
a (set-valued) random variable (also called privacy profile)
Yw with yw being its realization. For example, suppose yw =
{a} for some location a (i.e., the user’s private location is
a ∈ V). In this case, the user may share with the system a
collection of locations a1, . . . , am containing a (but not re-
vealing which one it is), w.l.o.g. a = a1. In this case the dis-
tribution shared P (Yw = {ai}) = 1m is simply the uniform
distribution over the candidate locations. Figure 2 illustrates
the notions of sensing and privacy profiles for a user.
We use YW = [Y1, . . . , YN ] to refer to the collection of
all (independent) variables associated with population W
and assume that YW is distributed according to a facto-
rial joint distribution P (YW) =
∏
w P (Yw). The sensing
profile yw (and the actual sensor data obtained from sens-
ing at locations yw) is revealed to the application only af-
ter it commits to provide the desired incentives to the user
w. Then, the goal is to select a set of users S to maximize
EYW [g(yS)], i.e., the expected utility, where the expectation
is taken over the realizations of YW w.r.t. P (YW).
Incentive structure for privacy tradeoff. We assume
that users are willing to share certain non-sensitive private
information in return for monetary incentives. Each user w
has a private cost cw ∈ R≥0 that she experiences for her
privacy tradeoff. Instead of revealing cw, she only reveals a
bid bw ∈ R≥0. We are interested in truthful mechanisms,
where it is a dominant strategy for a user to report bw = cw,
i.e., users cannot increase their profit (in expectation) by ly-
ing about their true cost. We assume that costs have known
bounded support, i.e., cw ∈ [cmin, cmax].
Optimization problem. Given a strict budget constraint
B, the goal of the sensing application is to design a mech-
anism M, which implements an allocation policy to se-
lect participants S and a payment scheme to make truth-
ful payments θs to each of the participants, with the goal of
maximizing the expected utility. Instead of committing to a
fixed set of participants S in advance (non-adaptive policy),
we are interested in mechanisms that implement an adap-
tive policy taking into account the observations made so far
(revealed sensing profiles of participants already selected)
when choosing the next user. Formally, the goal of the mech-
anism is to adaptively select participants S∗ along with the
payments θS∗ , such that
S∗ = arg max
S⊆W
EYW [g(yS)] subject to
∑
s∈S
θs ≤ B. (1)
Here, the set of participants S selected and the payments θS
may depend on the realization of YW as well. We formally
introduce adaptive policies in subsequent sections.
Existing Mechanisms
We first review existing mechanisms that fall short of either
privacy-preservation, adaptivity or truthfulness. In next sec-
tion, we then build on these and present our main contribu-
tion: a privacy-respecting, truthful and adaptive mechanism.
Non-private mechanisms
Consider first an unrealistic setting, where the system has
full information about the users’ exact sensing profiles and
their true costs. In such a setting, Problem 1 reduces to
that of budgeted maximization of a monotone non-negative
submodular function with non-uniform costs, studied by
Sviridenko (2004). A simple algorithm combining partial
enumeration with greedy selection guarantees a utility of
at least (1 − 1/e) (= 0.63) times that obtained by optimal
selection OPT. This result is tight under reasonable com-
plexity assumptions (Feige 1998). We denote this setting
and mechanism as GREEDY. Note that each participant
is paid their true cost in this untruthful setting. Now,
consider the non-private setting with unknown true costs.
The problem then requires designing a truthful budget fea-
sible mechanism for monotone submodular set functions,
as done by (Singer 2010; Chen, Gravin, and Lu 2011;
Singer 2012). In this setting, a constant factor 1/7.91
(= 0.13) approximation compared to OPT can be achieved,
using a mechanism that we will refer to as TGREEDY.
TGREEDY executes a greedy allocation on a reduced budget
with carefully chosen stopping criteria (for ensuring budget
Untruthful Truthful
Priv. off GREEDY TGREEDY
Priv. on (Non-Ad.) CONSTGREEDY CONSTTGREEDY
Priv. on (Adaptive) SEQGREEDY SEQTGREEDY
Table 1: Different information settings and mechanisms.
feasibility), in order to select a set of participants and then
computes the truthful payments to be made to them.
Non-adaptive mechanisms with privacy
In our case, where privacy is preserved through random ob-
fuscation, one must deal with the stochasticity caused by the
uncertainty about users’ sensing profiles. Here, the objective
G(S) ≡ EYW [g(yS)] =
∑
yW
P (YW = yW)f
(⋃
s∈S
ys
)
in (1) can be seen as an expectation over multiple submodu-
lar set functions, one for each realisation of the privacy pro-
file variables YW . However, as submodularity is preserved
under expectations, the set function G(S) is submodular as
well. One can therefore still apply the mechanisms GREEDY
and TGREEDY in order to obtain near-optimal non-adaptive
solutions (i.e., the set of participants is fixed in advance)
to Problem (1). We denote these non-adaptive (constant)
mechanisms applied to our privacy-preserving setting as
CONSTGREEDY and CONSTTGREEDY.
Untruthful, adaptive mechanisms with privacy
Instead of non-adaptively committing to the set S of
participants a priori, one may wish to obtain increased
utility through adaptive (active/sequential) selection, i.e., by
taking into account the observations from the users selected
so far when choosing the next user. Without assumptions,
computing such an optimal policy for Problem (1) is
intractable. Fortunately, as long as the sensing quality
function f is monotone and submodular, Problem (1)
satisfies a natural condition called adaptive submodularity
(Golovin and Krause 2011). This condition generalizes the
classical notion of submodularity to sequential decision /
active selection problems as faced here.
Adaptive submodularity requires, in our setting, that the
expected benefit of any fixed user w ∈ W given a set of
observations (i.e., set of users and observed sensing profiles)
can never increase as we make more observations. Formally,
consider the conditional expected marginal gain of adding
a user w ∈ W \ S to an existing set of observations yS ⊆
W ×O:
∆g(w|yS) =EYw [g(yS ∪ {(w, yw)})− g(yS)|yS ]
=
∑
y∈O
P (Yw = y|yS) · [g(yS ∪ {(w, y)})− g(yS)].
Function g with distribution P (YW) is adaptive submodu-
lar, if ∆g(w|yS) ≥ ∆g(w|yS′) whenever yS ⊆ yS′ . Thus,
the gain of a user w, in expectation over its unknown privacy
profile, can never increase as we select and obtain data from
more participants.
Proposition 1. Suppose f is monotone and submodular.
Then the objective g and distribution P used in Problem 1
are adaptive submodular.
Above Proposition follows from Theorem 6.1 of Golovin
and Krause (2011), assuming distribution P is factorial
(i.e., the random obfuscation is independent between users).
Given this problem structure, for the simpler, untruthful set-
ting (i.e., known true costs), we can thus use the sequential
greedy policy for stochastic submodular maximization stud-
ied by Golovin and Krause (2011). This approach is denoted
by SEQGREEDY and obtains a utility of at least (1 − 1/e)
(= 0.63) times that of optimal sequential policy SEQOPT.
Table 1 summarizes the settings and mechanisms consid-
ered so far. They all fall short of at least one of the desired
characteristics of privacy-preservation, truthfulness or adap-
tivity. In the next section, we present our main contribution
– SEQTGREEDY, an adaptive mechanism for the realistic
setting of privacy-sensitive and strategic agents.
Our main mechanism: SEQTGREEDY
We now describe our mechanism M = (piM,θM), with
allocation policy piM and payment scheme θM. M first
obtains the bids BW and privacy profiles P (YW) from all
users, runs the allocation policypiM to adaptively select par-
ticipants S and makes observations yS during selection. At
the end, it computes payments θS using scheme θM. The al-
location policy piM can be thought of as a decision tree. For-
mally, a policy pi : 2W×O → W is a partial mapping from
observations yS made so far to the next user w ∈ W \ S
to be recruited, denoted by pi(yS) = w. We seek policies
that are provably competitive with the optimal (intractable)
sequential policy SEQOPT. θM computes payments which
are truthful in expectation (a user cannot increase her total
expected profit by lying about her true cost, for a fixed set
of bids of other users) and individually rational (θs ≥ bs).
For budget feasibility, the allocation policy needs to ensure
that the budget B is sufficient to make the payments θS to
all selected participants. Next, we describe in detail the al-
location policy and payment scheme of SEQTGREEDY with
these desirable properties.
Allocation policy of SEQTGREEDY
Policy 1 presents the allocation policy of SEQTGREEDY.
The main ingredient of the policy is to greedily pick the next
user that maximizes the expected marginal gain ∆g(w|yS)
per unit cost. The policy uses additional stopping criteria
to enforce budget feasibility, similar to TGREEDY (Chen,
Gravin, and Lu 2011). Firstly, it runs on a reduced budget
B/α. Secondly, it uses a proportional share rule ensuring
that the expected marginal gain per unit cost for the next
potential participant is at least equal to or greater than the
expected utility of the new set of participants divided by
the budget. We shall prove below that α = 2 achieves the
desired properties.
Payment characterization of SEQTGREEDY
The payment scheme is based on the characterization of
threshold payments used by TGREEDY (Singer 2010). How-
Policy 1: Allocation policy of SEQTGREEDY
1 Input: budget B; usersW; privacy profiles YW ;
bids BW ; reduced budget factor α;
2 Initialize:
• Outputs: participants S ← ∅; observations yS ← ∅;
marginals ∆S ← ∅;
• Variables: remaining usersW ′ ←W;
begin
3 whileW ′ 6= ∅ do
4 w∗ ← arg maxw∈W′ ∆g(w|yS)bw ;
5 ∆w∗ ← ∆g(w∗|yS) ;
6 if BS + b∗w ≤ B then
7 if b∗w ≤ Bα · ∆w∗((∑s∈S ∆s)+∆w∗) then
8 S ← S ∪ {w∗}; ∆S ←∆S ∪ {∆w∗} ;
9 Observe yw∗ ; yS ← yS ∪ {(w∗, yw∗)};
10 W ′ ←W ′ \ {w∗} ;
11 else
12 W ′ ← ∅ ;
13 else
14 W ′ ←W ′ \ {w∗} ;
15 Output: S; yS ; ∆S
ever, a major difficulty arises from the fact that the compu-
tation of payments for a participant depends also on the un-
allocated users, whose sensing profiles are not known to the
mechanism. Let S denote the set of participants allocated
by piM along with making observations yS . Let us consider
the set of all possible realizations of YW = yW ⊆ W ×O
consistent with yS , i.e., yS ⊆ yW . We denote this set by
ZW,S = [y1,y2 . . .yr . . .yZ ], where Z = |ZW,S |. We first
discuss how to compute the payment for each one of these
possible realizations yr ∈ ZW,S , denoted by θds(yr) (where
d indicates here an association with the deterministic setting
of knowing the exact sensing profiles of all users w ∈ W).
These payments for specific realizations are then combined
together to compute the final payment to each participant.
Payment θds for a given yW . Consider the case where
the variables YW are in state yW ∈ ZW,S and let S be
the set of participants allocated by the policy. We use the
well-known characterization of Myerson (1981) of truthful
payments in single-parameter domains. It states that a mech-
anism is truthful if i) the allocation rule is monotone (i.e., an
already allocated user cannot be unallocated by lowering her
bid, for a fixed set of bids of others) and ii) allocated users
are paid threshold payments (i.e., the highest bid they can
declare before being removed from the allocated set). Mono-
tonicity follows naturally from the greedy allocation policy,
which sorts users based on expected marginal gain per unit
cost. To compute threshold payments, we need to consider a
maximum of all the possible bids that a user can declare and
still get allocated. We next explain how this can be done.
Let us renumber the users S = {1, . . . , i, . . . , k} in the
order of their allocation. and let us analyze the payment for
participant s = i. Consider running the policy on an alter-
nate setW ′ =W\{i} and let S ′ = {1, . . . , j, . . . , k′} be the
allocated set (users renumbered again based on order of al-
location when running the policy onW ′). ∆S and ∆′S′ are
the marginal contributions of the participants in the above
two runs of the policy. We define ∆i(j) to be the marginal
contribution of i (from S) if it has to replace the position
of j (in set S ′). Now, consider the bid that i can declare
to replace j in S ′ by making a marginal contribution per
cost higher than j, given by bi(j) =
∆i(j)·bj
∆′j
. Additionally,
the bid that i can declare must satisfy the proportional share
rule, denoted by ρi(j) = Bα · ∆i(j)/
(
(
∑
s′∈[j−1] ∆
′
s′ ) + ∆i(j)
).
By taking the minimum of these two values, we get θdi(j) =
min(bi(j), ρi(j)) as the bid that i can declare to replace j in
S ′. The threshold payment for participant s = i is given by
θdi = maxj∈[k′+1] θ
d
i(j).
Computing the final payment θs. For each yr ∈ ZW,S ,
compute θd,ri = θ
d
i (y
r). The final payment made to partici-
pant s is given by θs =
∑
yr∈ZW,S P (YW = y
r|yS) · θd,rs .
Note that the set ZW,S could be exponentially large, and
hence computing the exact θs may be intractable. However,
one can use sampling to get estimates of θs in polynomial
time (using Hoeffding’s inequality to bound sample com-
plexity) and thus implement an approximately truthful pay-
ment scheme to any desired accuracy. Further, note that the
approximation guarantees ofM do not require computation
of the payments at all, and only require execution of the al-
location policy, which runs in polynomial time.
Analysis of SEQTGREEDY
We now analyze the mechanism and prove its desirable
properties. The proofs of all theorems are presented in the
extended version of the paper (Singla and Krause 2013a).
We only sketch them here.
Theorem 1. SEQTGREEDY is truthful in expectation, i.e.,
no user can increase her profit in expectation by lying about
her true cost, for a fixed set of bids of other users.
Firstly, truthfulness of payments θd,rs is proved for a con-
sidered realization yr. This is done by showing the mono-
tonicity property of the greedy allocation policy and prov-
ing the threshold nature of the payment θd,rs . Truthfulness of
the actual payment θs follows from the fact that it is a linear
combination of individually truthful payments θd,rs .
Theorem 2. Payments made by SEQTGREEDY are individ-
ually rational, i.e. θs ≥ bs.
This is proved by showing a lower bound of bs on each of
the payments θd,rs used to compute the final payment θs.
Theorem 3. For α = 2, SEQTGREEDY is budget feasible,
i.e., θS ≤ B. Moreover, an application specific tighter bound
on α can be computed to better utilize the budget.
We first show that when full budget B is used by mech-
anism, the maximum raise in bid b′s that a participant s
can make, keeping the bids of other users to be the same,
to still get selected by mechanism is upper-bounded by
α·B·∆s/(∑s′∈S ∆s′ ). By adapting the proof of Chen, Gravin,
and Lu (2011), we prove that α is bounded by 2. Surpris-
ingly, this payment bound on α holds irrespectively of the
payment scheme used by the mechanism. Hence, when the
budget is reduced by α = 2, this results in an upper bound on
the payments made to any participant by B · ∆s/(∑s′∈S ∆s′ ).
Summing over these payments ensures budget feasibility.
Moreover, by adapting a proof from Singer (2010), we show
that a tighter bound on α can be computed based on the char-
acterization of threshold payments used by SEQTGREEDY.
Intuitively, the proof is based on the fact that a raise in bid
that a participant can make depends on how much utility the
application would lose if she refused to participate.
Theorem 4. For α = 2, SEQTGREEDY achieves a utility of
at least
(
e−1
3e −γ
)
times that obtained by the optimal policy
SEQOPT with full knowledge of the true costs. Hereby, γ is
the ratio of the participants’ largest marginal contribution
fmax and the expected utility achieved by SEQOPT.
We show that, because of the diminishing returns property of
the utility function, the stopping criteria used by the mech-
anism based on proportional share and using only an α pro-
portion of the budget still allows the allocation of sufficiently
many participants to achieve a competitive amount of utility.
As a concrete example, if each participant can contribute at
most 1% to the optimal utility (i.e., γ = 0.01), Theorem 4
guarantees a constant approximation factor of 0.20.
Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we carry out extensive experiments to un-
derstand the practical performance of our mechanism on a
realistic community sensing case study.
Benchmarks. We compare against the following bench-
marks and state-of-the-art mechanisms.
• SEQGREEDY (unrealistically) assumes access to the true
costs of the users, thus measuring the loss incurred by
SEQTGREEDY for enforcing truthfulness and serving as
upper bound benchmark on untruthful mechanisms.
• RANDOM allocates users randomly until the budget is ex-
hausted and pays each participant its true cost. This rep-
resents a lower bound benchmark on untruthful mecha-
nisms.
• CONSTTGREEDY is the non-adaptive variant of SEQT-
GREEDY and the state-of-the-art truthful mechanism.
• TGREEDY (unrealistically) assumes access to the exact
sensing profiles of the users and hence provides insights
in measuring the loss incurred due to privacy protection.
Metrics and experiments. The primary metric we
measure is the utility acquired by the application. We
also measure budget required to achieve a specified util-
ity. To this end, we conduct experiments by varying
the given budget and then varying the specified utility,
for a fixed obfuscation level. To further understand the
impact of random obfuscation, we then vary the level
of obfuscation and measure i) % Gain from adaptivity
(SEQTGREEDY vs. CONSTTGREEDY), ii) % Loss from
truthfulness (SEQTGREEDY vs. SEQGREEDY), and iii) %
Loss from privacy (SEQTGREEDY vs. TGREEDY). We
present below the results obtained based on data gathered
from Mechanical Turk (henceforth MTurk). The primary
purpose of using Mechanical Turk (MTurk) data is to evalu-
ate on realistic distributions rather than making assumptions
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Figure 3: (a) Bids ($) and sensitivity ([1-100]) for different levels of privacy tradeoff; (b) Distribution of bids ($) for sharing
location at a granularity level of zip codes; (c) Correlation of bids ($) (for sharing zip) with mobility (daily distance in miles).
about bids and participants’ mobility. We carried out exper-
iments on simulated distributions as well with qualitatively
similar results.
Experimental setup and data sets
We now describe our setup and data collection from MTurk.
Community sensing application. Suppose we wish to
monitor air quality using mobile sensors (Aberer et al.
2010). We consider a granularity level of zip codes and lo-
cations V correspond to the zip codes of state Nevada, USA.
We obtained information related to latitude, longitude, city
and county of these zips from publicly available data 2. This
represents a total of 220 zip codes located in 98 cities and 17
counties. In order to encourage spatial coverage, we choose
our objective f such that one unit utility is obtained for ev-
ery zip code location observed by the selected participants.
To simulate a realistic population of the N users, we also
obtained the population statistics for these zip codes 3.
MTurk data and user attributes. We posted a Human
Intelligence Task (HIT) on MTurk in form of a survey, where
workers were told about an option to participate in a commu-
nity sensing application. Our HIT on MTurk clearly stated
the purpose as purely academic, requesting workers to pro-
vide correct and honest information. The HIT presented the
application scenario and asked workers about their willing-
ness (”yes/no”) to participate in such applications. 75% (487
out of 650) responded positively. Workers were asked to ex-
press their sensitivity (on scale of [1-100]), as well as the
payment bids (in range of [1-500] $) they desire to receive
about exposing their location at the granularity of home ad-
dress, zip, city, state or country respectively. Additionally,
workers were asked about their daily mobility to gather data
for defining the sensing radii of the users in our experiments.
A total of 650 workers participated in our HIT, restricted
to workers from the USA with more than 90% approval rate
and were paid a fixed amount each. We used the data of 487
workers for our experiments, who responded positively to
participate in the envisioned application. Figure 4(a) shows
the mean bids and expressed sensitivity for different levels
of obfuscation. Figure 3(b) shows the distribution of bids for
exposing zip level location information. A mean daily mo-
2http://www.populardata.com/downloads.html
3http://mcdc2.missouri.edu/
bility of 18 miles was reported. Figure 3(c) shows no corre-
lation between their daily mobility (related to user’s sensing
radius and hence utility) and bids for exposing zip code in-
formation (related to user’s bid).
Parameter choices and user profiles. We consider a pop-
ulation of size N = 500, distributed according to the popu-
lation statistics for the zip codes. We used the distribution of
bids reported for sharing location at a granularity level of zip
codes. We set cmin = 0.01 and cmax = 1 by scaling the bids in
this range. For a given location of a user, we used the distri-
butions of daily mobility to define the sensing radius of the
users. We set the maximum possible utility obtained from
each user to fmax = 15 by limiting the maximal number of
observable zip code locations of each user to 15, which are
randomly sampled from the locations covered by the user’s
sensing radius.
Given a user’s zip location, the sensing profile of the user
is uniquely specified. To create privacy profiles, we used
obfuscated user locations, by considering obfuscation at
city or state level in which the user is located. We also con-
sidered obfuscation within a fixed radius, centered around
the user’s location. For each of the obfuscated zip codes,
multiple corresponding sensing profiles are generated,
which collectively define the user’s privacy profile.
Results
We now discuss the findings from our experiments.
Computing tighter bounds on payment. Based on The-
orem 3, we compute tighter bounds on the payment and opti-
mized the budget reduction factor α used by our mechanism
in an application specific manner.
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Figure 4: (a) and (d) compares SEQTGREEDY using α = 2
w.r.t. to a variant using an optimized value of α.
In community sensing applications with a large number
of users and bounded maximal contribution from each user,
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Figure 5: In (a) and (d), for a fixed obfuscation level of 100 miles radius, budget given and desired utility are varied. In (b),
(c), (e) and (f)) the obfuscation level is varied. (b) and (c) measure utility acquired for a given budget of 5$ and show about 5%
adaptivity gain. (e) and (f) measure the budget required (in $) to achieve a utility of 120 and show up to 30% adaptivity gain.
α is close to 1, resulting in a utilization of almost the entire
budget. Figure 4 demonstrates the benefit of using tighter
payment bounds (optimized α), compared to a mechanism
simply using α = 2. Henceforth, in the results, we use the
optimized α for all the truthful mechanisms.
Varying the given budget and specified utility. For a
fixed obfuscation level of 100 miles radius, Figures 5(a) and
5(d) show the effect of varying the given budget and desired
utility respectively. Figure 5(a) illustrates the bounded ap-
proximation of our mechanism SEQTGREEDY w.r.t. SEQ-
GREEDY and up to 5% improvement over CONSTTGREEDY
in terms of acquired utility. Figure 5(d) shows that the bud-
get required to achieve a specified utility by our mechanism
is larger w.r.t. SEQGREEDY and we achieve up to 20% re-
duction in required budget by using the adaptive mechanism.
Utility acquired at different obfuscation levels. In Fig-
ures 5(b) and 5(c), the acquired utility is measured for a
given budget of 5$ by varying the obfuscation level. We can
see that adaptivity helps acquire about 5% higher utility and
this adaptivity gain increases with higher obfuscation (more
privacy). The loss from truthfulness is bounded (by 25%),
agreeing with our approximation guarantees. The loss from
the lack of private information grows, but so also does the
gain from adaptivity, which helps to reduce the loss we in-
cur due to privacy protection.
Budget required at different obfuscation levels. In Fig-
ures 5(e) and 5(f), the required budget is computed for a
desired utility value of 120 by varying the obfuscation level.
We can see an increasing adaptivity gain, up to a total of 30%
reduction in required budget. As the privacy level increases,
the adaptivity gain increases to help partially recover the in-
curred loss from privacy in terms of budget requirement.
Conclusions and Future Work
There is much potential in intelligent systems that incen-
tivize and empower their users to consciously share cer-
tain private information. We presented a principled approach
for negotiating access to such private information in com-
munity sensing. By using insights from mechanism design
and adaptive submodular optimization, we designed the first
adaptive, truthful and budget feasible mechanism guaranteed
to recruit a near-optimal subset of participants. We demon-
strated the feasibility and efficiency of our approach in a re-
alistic case study. Privacy tradeoff is a personal choice and
sensitive issue. In realistic deployments of the proposed ap-
proach, the choice of participation ultimately lies with the
users. We believe that this integrated approach connecting
privacy, utility and incentives provides an important step to-
wards developing practical, yet theoretically well-founded
techniques for community sensing.
There are some natural extensions for future work. Here,
we considered a fairly simple utility function for the sens-
ing phenomena. More complex objectives, e.g., reduction in
predictive variance in a statistical model, can be readily in-
corporated. Further, we would like to design an application
(e.g., smartphone app) for deploying our approach in a real
world sensing application. It would also be interesting to ap-
ply our mechanisms to other application domains that in-
volve uncertainty, sequential decision-making and strategic
interactions, e.g., viral marketing.
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Proof of Theorem 1
Let S denote the set of participants allocated by piM
along with making observations yS . We use ZW,S =
[y1,y2 . . .yr . . .yZ ], where Z = |ZW,S |, to denote the set
of possible realizations of YW = yW ⊆ W ×O consistent
with yS . In Lemma 3, we first prove the truthfulness of the
payment θds(y
r) made for each of these possible realizations
yr ∈ ZW,S (also denoted as θd,rs ). To prove Lemma 3, we
first show allocation rule is monotone (Lemma 1) and allo-
cated users are paid threshold payments (Lemma 2).
Lemma 1. For a given yW , allocation policy of the mech-
anism is monotone i.e ∀i ∈ [n] and for every b−i, if b′i ≤
bi then i ∈ pi(bi, b−i) implies i ∈ pi(b′i, b−i)
Proof. The monotonicity of the greedy scheme is easy to
see: By lowering her bid, any allocated participant would
only increase their marginal gain per unit cost and thus
jump ahead in the sorting order considered by the allocation
policy.
Lemma 2. Payment θds for a given yW is a threshold pay-
ment, i.e., payment to each winning bidder is inf{b′i : i /∈
pi(b′i, b−i)}
Proof. The threshold payment for participant s = i is given
by θdi = maxj∈[k′+1](θ
d
i(j)) where θ
d
i(j) = min(bi(j), ρi(j))
as the bid that i can declare to replace j in S ′. We have
bi(j) =
∆i(j)·bj
∆′j
and ρi(j) = Bα ·
∆i(j)∑
s′∈[j−1] ∆
′
s′+∆i(j)
. Let us
consider r to be the index for which θdi = min(bi(r), ρi(r)).
Declaring a bid of min(bi(r), ρi(r)) ensures that swould def-
initely get allocated at position r in the alternate run of the
policy. Let us consider the following four cases:
Case 1: bi(r) ≤ ρi(r) & bi(r) = maxj bi(j)
Reporting a bid higher than bi(r) places the i after the un-
alocated user k′ + 1 in the alternate run of the mechanism,
thereby i would not be allocated.
Case 2: bi(r) ≤ ρi(r) & bi(r) < maxj bi(j)
Consider some j for which bi(r) < bi(j). Because of the
maximal condition for r, it must be the case that ρi(j) ≤
bi(r) ≤ bi(j). Thus, declaring a bid higher than bi(r) would
violate the proportional share allocation condition and hence
i would not be allocated. For some other j for which bi(r) ≥
bi(j), declaring a bid higher than bi(r) would put i after j and
hence i would not be allocated at considered position j.
Case 3: ρi(r) ≤ bi(r) & ρi(r) = maxj ρi(j)
Reporting a bid higher than ρi(r) violates the proportional
share allocation condition at each of the indices in j ∈ [k′+
1], hence i would not be allocated.
Case 4: ρi(r) ≤ bi(r) & ρi(r) < maxj ρi(j)
Consider some j for which ρi(r) < ρi(j). Because of the
maximal condition for r, it must be the case that bi(j) ≤
ρi(r) ≤ ρi(j). Thus, declaring a bid higher than ρi(r) would
put i after j and hence i would not be allocated. For any
other j for which ρi(r) ≥ ρi(j), declaring a bid higher than
bi(r) would violate the proportional share allocation condi-
tion and hence i would not be allocated at considered posi-
tion j.
The anaylysis of above four cases completes the proof.
Lemma 3. Payment θds for a given yW is truthful.
Proof. To prove this, we use the well-known characteriza-
tion of Myerson (1981). For the case of deterministic set-
tings in single parameter domains, a mechanism is truthful
if the allocation rule is monotone and the allocated agents
are paid threshold payments.
Proof of Theorem 1. The final payment made to partici-
pant s is given by θs =
∑
yr∈ZW,S P (YW = y
r|yS) · θd,rs .
From Lemma 3, each of the payments θd,rs are truthful, i.e.,
the profit of a user cannot be increased by deviating from
their true cost. Taking a linear combination of these pay-
ments ensures truthful payment as well.
Proof of Theorem 2
In Lemma 4, we first prove the individual rationality of the
payment θds(y
r) made for each of these possible realizations
yr ∈ ZW,S (also denoted as θd,rs ).
Lemma 4. Payment θds for a given yW is individually ratio-
nal i.e. θds ≥ bs
Proof. Consider the bid that i can declare to be allocated
at position j = i (i.e. back at its original position) in the
alternate run of the mechanism. θdi(i) = min(bi(i), ρi(i)). We
will show that bi ≤ θdi(i).
Showing bi(i) ≥ bi
bi(i) =
∆i(i) · bj
∆′j
=
∆i · bj
∆j
(1)
≥ ∆i · bi
∆i
= bi (2)
In step 1, the second equality holds from the fact that the
first i− 1 allocated elements in both runs of the policies are
the same and hence ∆i(i) = ∆i and ∆′j = ∆j . In step 2, the
first inequality holds from the fact that bj∆j ≥ bi∆i since i was
allocated in the original run of the policy after i− 1, instead
of user j.
Showing ρi(i) ≥ bi
ρi(i) =
B
α
· ∆i(i)∑
s′∈[i−1] ∆
′
s′ + ∆i(i)
=
B
α
· ∆i∑
s∈[i−1] ∆s + ∆i
≥ bi (3)
In step 3, the first equality holds from the fact that the first
i − 1 allocated elements in both the runs of the policies are
same. The second inequality follows from the proportional
share creteria used to decide the allocation of i after i − 1
users were allocated already.
Now, we have bi ≤ θdi(i) ≤ maxj∈[k′+1](θdi(j)) = θdi
Proof of Theorem 2. The final payment made to partici-
pant s is given by θs =
∑
yr∈ZW,S P (YW = y
r|yS) · θd,rs .
From Lemma 4, each of the payment θd,rs ≥ bs. Taking a
linear combination of these payments ensures individual ra-
tionality in expectation as well.
Proof of Theorem 3
The theorem rests on the following Lemma 5 which upper
bounds the payments made to each participant by α≥1 times
their marginal contribution to the total utility of the final set
of participants.
Lemma 5. When full budget B is used by mechanism, the
maximum raise in bid b′s that a participant s can make, keep-
ing the bids of others same, to still get selected by mecha-
nism is upper bounded by α · ∆s∑
s∈S ∆s
· B where α ≤ 2.
Proof. Consider any random realization YW = yW . Let S
be the set of participants selected by policy alongwith mak-
ing observations yS . Let us renumber the users in which
they were allocated by mechanism S = {1, 2, . . . , i−1, i(=
s), . . . , k} and let’s analyze the upper bound on the thresh-
old payment for participant s = i. Irrespective of the pay-
ment scheme used, we consider how much raised bid partic-
ipant i (b′i raised from bi) can declare to still selected by the
mechanism, keeping the bids of other users (b−i) same. We
use B = (bi, b−i) to denote original bids and B′ = (b′i, b−i)
to denote modified bids. Consider running policy on alter-
nate bids B′ and let S ′ = {1, 2, . . . , j − 1, j(= s), . . . , k′}
be the allocated set (users again renumbered based on order
of allocation). For distintion, we use ∆ and ∆′ to denote the
marginal contributions of the users in the above two different
runs of the policy. Let T ′ denote the subset of participants
from S ′ which were allocated just before s was allocated at
position j. Let us consider following two cases:
Case 1: S \ T ′ = ∅.
This condition also implies that T ′ ∪ {s} = T ′ ∪ S. Let
∆′(s|yT ′) denote marginal contribution of s when added by
policy after T ′. We have
b′i ≤ B ·
∆′(s|yT ′)
g(yT ′ ∪ {s, ys}) = B ·
∆′(s|yT ′)
g(yT ′ ∪ yS) (1)
≤ B · ∆
′(s|yT ′)
g(yS)
≤ B · ∆s
g(yS)
(2)
Setting b′i = α · B · ∆sg(yS) , we get
α = 1 (3)
First inequality in step 1 follows from the propotional share
allocation creteria and second equality follows from the fact
that T ′ ∪ {s} = T ′ ∪ S . In step 2, first inquality follows
from monotonicity of function g and second inequality fol-
lows from the fact that increasing the bid by s can only
pushes her position lower in the allocation, decreasing the
marginal contribution. Note that here ∆s is used to denote
the marginal contribution of s when it was allocated at posi-
tion i in the original run of the policy. Finally, in step 3, the
inequality holds for α = 1.
Case 2: S \ T ′ = R
We have
b′i ≤ B ·
∆′(s|yT ′)
g(yT ′ ∪ {s, ys}) ≤ B ·
∆s
g(yT ′ ∪ {s, ys}) (4)
Setting b′i = α · B · ∆sg(yS) , we get
g(yT ′ ∪ {s, ys})
g(yS)
≤ 1
α
(5)
Now, consider adding some user on top of yT ′ ∪ {s, ys}.
For some r0 ∈ R, it must hold that marginal value by unit
cost of adding r0 is higher than that of addding wholeR. We
have,
g(yR ∪ yT ′ ∪ {s, ys})− g(yT ′ ∪ {s, ys})
B′(R)
≤ ∆
′(r0|yT ′ ∪ {s, ys})
b′r0
≤ ∆
′(r0|yT ′)
b′r0
≤ ∆
′(s|yT ′)
b′i
(6)
≤ ∆s
b′i
=
g(yS)
α · B (7)
In step 6, first inequality holds from submodularity of g and
second holds from that fact that s was choosen to be added
on set T ′ compared to r0 at position j by the alternate run
of the mechansim. In step 7, first inequality follows from the
fact that increasing the bid by s can only pushes her position
lower in the allocation, decreasing the marginal contribution.
The second inequality holds by setting b′i = α · B · ∆sg(yS) .
Now, using the fact thatB′(R) ≤ B, and g(yS) ≤ g(yS∪
yT ′) = g(yR ∪ yT ′ ∪ {s, ys}), we have
g(yS)− g(yT ′ ∪ {s, ys})
B ≤
g(yS)
α · B (8)
g(yT ′ ∪ {s, ys})
g(yS)
≥ (1− 1
α
) (9)
Combining step 5 and step 9, we get an upper bound on α =
2.
Proof of Theorem 3. Consider running the mechanism
with reduced budget of B2 (i.e. seting parameter α = 2 in
the mechanism). Let a set S allocated by mechanism and
θS be the payments made to participants. By summing over
these payments, we get :∑
s∈S
θs ≤
∑
s∈S
α · ∆s∑
s∈S ∆s
· B
2
≤ B.
The inequality here holds from Lemma 5 which bounds the
maximum threshold payment for a participant s by α ≤ 2.
Proof of Theorem 4
Proof of Theorem 4 rests on proving following two lemmas.
In Lemma 6, we first prove an upper bound on the utility
of optimal sequential (untruthful) mechanism SEQOPT as
e/(e− 1) times the utility on sequential greedy mechanism
SEQGREEDY, with an extra additive factor of fmax. Then,
in Lemma 7, we show that, because of diminishing returns
property of the utility functions, the stopping criteria used by
the mechanism based on proportional share and using only
α proportion of the budget still allows the allocation of suf-
ficiently many participants to achieve a competitive amount
of utility for the application. Additionally, we use the fact
that in our settings, the utility contribution of each partici-
pant is small compared to the overall utility achieved by the
mechanism.
We use piOPT , piG, piTG to denote the allocation policies
of mechanisms SEQOPT, SEQGREEDY and SEQTGREEDY.
Also, we use gavg(pi) to denote the average expected util-
ity obtained by running the allocation policy pi. We use
the terms mechanism and policy interchangeably whenever
clear from the context.
Lemma 6. Expected utility of optimal sequential policy
SEQOPT is bounded by the utility of sequential greedy policy
SEQGREEDY as gavg(piOPT ) ≤ e/(e− 1)
[
gavg(piG)+fmax
]
.
Proof. Let piG executes for l steps allocating a set Sl. Let us
renumber the users in order of which they were considered
during execution of piG and denote Sl+1 = {1, 2, . . . , i −
1, i, . . . , l, l + 1} where l + 1 is the first unallocated user
because of budget constraint. Consider the step when partic-
ipant i is added by the policy on top of Si−1. We consider
the expected marginal utility of executing the whole piOPT
after step i − 1, conditioned on observations ySi−1 . Let yT
be the final set of participants alongwith observations ob-
tained by executing piOPT after Si−1, where ySi−1 ⊆ yT .
Let r ∈ T \Si−1. Given the submodularity of g, it must hold
that:
gavg(yT ∪ ySi−1)− gavg(ySi−1)
B(T )−B(Si−1) ≤
∆r
br
≤ ∆i
bi
(1)
gavg(piOPT )− gavg(ySi−1)
B ≤
gavg(ySi)− gavg(ySi−1)
bi
(2)
gavg(ySi) ≥
bi
B · gavg(piOPT ) +
(
1− biB
) · gavg(ySi−1)
(3)
Step 1 uses the fact that i was choosen over r by greediy
policy. Step 2 uses the definition of ∆i = gavg(ySi) −
gavg(ySi−1) and gavg(piOPT ) ≤ gavg(yT ). By recursively
applying step 3 results for l + 1 steps, we get:
gavg(ySl+1) ≥
[
1−
∏
i∈[1...l+1]
(
1− biB
)] · gavg(piOPT )
≥
[
1− (1− B(Sl+1)B · 1l + 1)l+1] · gavg(piOPT )
(4)
≥
[
1− (1− 1
l + 1
)l+1] · gavg(piOPT ) (5)
≥ (1− 1
e
) · gavg(piOPT ) (6)
Step 4 uses the fact that minimum of the product for n vari-
ables
[
1−∏i∈[1...n] (1− xiX )] is achived when all the vari-
ables take value as xi = Xn (where X =
∑
i∈[1...n] xi). Step
5 uses the fact that B(Sl+1) > B and Step 6 uses the limit-
ing value of the equation.
gavg(piOPT ) ≤ ( e
e− 1) ·
(
gavg(ySl) + ∆l+1
)
(7)
≤ ( e
e− 1) ·
(
gavg(piG) + fmax
)
(8)
In step 7, we used the fact that gavg(ySl+1) = gavg(ySl) +
∆l+1. In step 8, we used the fact that ∆l+1 ≤ fmax and
gavg(piG) = gavg(ySl).
Lemma 7. Expected utility of sequential greedy policy SE-
QGREEDY is bounded by the utility of truthful greedy policy
SEQTGREEDY as gavg(piG) ≤ (1 +α)gavg(piTG) +αfmax.
Proof. Let piG executes for l steps allocating a set Sl and
piTG terminates after k ≤ l steps because of additional stop-
ping creteria allocating a set Sk ⊆ Sl. Let us renumber the
users in order of which they were considered during exe-
cution of piG and denote Sl = {1, 2, . . . , k, k + 1, . . . , l}.
Since k + 1 was not allocated by the piTG, we have: bk+1 >
B
α · ∆k+1(∑i∈Sk ∆i+∆k+1 ). Also, because of decreasing marginal
utility by cost ratio of the users considered by the policy, we
get:
bl
∆l
≥ · · · ≥ bj
∆j
≥ · · · ≥ bk+1
∆k+1
>
B
α
· 1
(
∑
i∈Sk ∆i + ∆k+1)
=⇒ ∀j ∈ [k + 1 . . . l], bj > B
α
· ∆j
(
∑
i∈Sk ∆i + ∆k+1)
B ≥
∑
j∈[k+1...l]
bj >
B
α
·
∑
j∈[k+1...l] ∆j
(
∑
i∈Sk ∆i + ∆k+1)
α · (gavg(piTG) + ∆k+1) ≥ (gavg(piG)− gavg(piTG)) (9)
gavg(piG) ≤ (1 + α)gavg(piTG) + αfmax (10)
In step 9, we used the fact that gavg(piG) =
∑
i∈Sl ∆i and
gavg(piTG) =
∑
i∈Sk ∆i. In step 10, we used the fact that
∆k+1 ≤ fmax.
Proof of Theorem 4. Combining the results of above two
lemmas, we get:
gavg(piOPT ) ≤ (1 + α) · e
e− 1
[
gavg(piTG) + fmax
]
=
(1 + α) · e
e− 1
(
1 +
fmax
gavg(piTG)
)
· gavg(piTG)
Now, we set α = 2. Also, using the fact that fmaxgavg(piTG) 
1 (i.e. each user can only contribute to a maximal of fmax
utility to the application which, for a large-scale application,
is very small compared to utility achieved by mechanism
under given budget), we get an approximation factor of 1/4.75
(= 0.22).
